Do direct-democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation?

Are direct-democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures? We conduct an experimental online vignette study with a German sample to investigate how voters' acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice Vol. 167; no. 1-2; pp. 47 - 65
Main Authors: Towfigh, Emanuel V, Goerg, Sebastian J, Glöckner, Andreas, Leifeld, Philip, Llorente-saguer, Aniol, Bade, Sophie, Kurschilgen, Carlos
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Nature B.V 01.04.2016
Subjects:
Acceptance
Decision making
Democracy
Direct democracy
Elections
Internet
Legal research
Participation
Political parties
Political representation
Political systems
Politics
Representative democracy
Studies
Voter behavior
Voters
United Kingdom > UK
Switzerland
Germany
ISSN:0048-5829, 1573-7101
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Are direct-democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures? We conduct an experimental online vignette study with a German sample to investigate how voters' acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is reached. For a set of different issues, we investigate how acceptance varies depending on whether the decision is the result of a direct-democratic institution, a party in a representative democracy, or an expert committee. Our results show that for important issues, direct democracy generates greater acceptance; this finding holds particularly for those voters who do not agree with a collectively chosen outcome. However, if the topic is of limited importance to the voters, acceptance does not differ between the mechanisms. Our results imply that a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy, conditional on the distribution of issue importance among the electorate, may be optimal with regard to acceptance of political decisions.
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ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-016-0330-y