Do direct-democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation?
Are direct-democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures? We conduct an experimental online vignette study with a German sample to investigate how voters' acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is r...
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| Vydáno v: | Public choice Ročník 167; číslo 1-2; s. 47 - 65 |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , , , , , , |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Dordrecht
Springer Nature B.V
01.04.2016
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| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 0048-5829, 1573-7101 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | Are direct-democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures? We conduct an experimental online vignette study with a German sample to investigate how voters' acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is reached. For a set of different issues, we investigate how acceptance varies depending on whether the decision is the result of a direct-democratic institution, a party in a representative democracy, or an expert committee. Our results show that for important issues, direct democracy generates greater acceptance; this finding holds particularly for those voters who do not agree with a collectively chosen outcome. However, if the topic is of limited importance to the voters, acceptance does not differ between the mechanisms. Our results imply that a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy, conditional on the distribution of issue importance among the electorate, may be optimal with regard to acceptance of political decisions. |
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| Bibliografie: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11127-016-0330-y |