Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts

Assumptions of risk aversion in modern economics are pervasive, and economists who substitute risk neutrality often do so with an apology. This is particularly true for contract theories, like the principal-agent model. Despite the theoretical prominence of risk aversion, empirical contract studies...

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Vydané v:	The American economic review Ročník 85; číslo 2; s. 447 - 451
Hlavní autori:	Allen, Douglas W., Lueck, Dean
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Menasha, Wis American Economic Association 01.05.1995 American Economic Assoc
Predmet:	Agricultural land Apologies Contract incentives Contract theory Contracts Cost sharing Costs Crops Economic models Economic theory Economics Enforcement Franchise agreements Franchising Mining industry Moral hazard models Neutrality Principal-agent models Risiko Risk Risk aversion Risk management Risk preferences Sharecropping Studies Theorie Theory Theory of Contracts Transaction costs Vertrag
ISSN:	0002-8282, 1944-7981
On-line prístup:	Získať plný text
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