An Approximation Algorithm for Multi-Unit Auctions : Numerical and Subject Experiments

In multi-unit auctions for a single item, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) attains allocative efficiency but suffers from its computational complexity. Takahashi and Shigeno thus proposed a greedy based approximation algorithm (GBA). In a subject experiment there was truly a difference in e...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Operations research and decisions Jg. 28; H. no. 1; S. 95 - 115
Hauptverfasser:	Satoshi Takahashi, Yoichi Izunaga, Naoki Watanabe
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Wrocław University of Science and Technology 01.01.2018
ISSN:	2081-8858, 2391-6060
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!