Development of a virtual power market model to investigate strategic and collusive behavior of market players

In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the...

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Vydané v:	Energy policy Ročník 61; s. 717 - 728
Hlavní autori:	Shafie-khah, Miadreza, Parsa Moghaddam, Mohsen, Sheikh-El-Eslami, Mohamad Kazem
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Kidlington Elsevier Ltd 01.10.2013 Elsevier Elsevier Science Ltd
Predmet:	Agency theory algorithms Applied sciences Behavior Behavior modification Case studies Collusion Collusive behavior Constraints Decision-making Economic data Economic theory Effectiveness studies Electric energy Electric power plants Energy Energy economics Energy industry Energy market Energy policy Energy prices Exact sciences and technology Game theory General, economic and professional studies Heuristic Long term market power Markets Methodology. Modelling new markets Power Power plants Prices Regulation Security Strategic behavior Virtual power market Wind power Collusive behavior Virtual power market Strategic behavior Collusion Electricity Heuristic method Markets Regulation policy Modeling Game theory Agent oriented Firm strategy
ISSN:	0301-4215, 1873-6777
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Abstract	In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated. The proposed model enables the market regulators to make decision before implementing new market rules with the confidence of their results. To represent the effectiveness of the proposed method, a case study including wind power plants is considered and the impact of various market rules on players’ behavior is simulated and discussed. Numerical studies indicate that simulating the strategic and collusive behavior prior to any change in the market rules is necessary. •A virtual power market model is proposed using a heuristic dynamic game theory.•The proposed model can simulate the behavior of market players in a certain period.•This model can evaluate the oligopoly, collusive and strategic behavior of players.•The price uncertainty and security constraint are considered.•Neglecting strategic behavior of players can cause adverse consequences.
AbstractList	In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated. The proposed model enables the market regulators to make decision before implementing new market rules with the confidence of their results. To represent the effectiveness of the proposed method, a case study including wind power plants is considered and the impact of various market rules on players' behavior is simulated and discussed. Numerical studies indicate that simulating the strategic and collusive behavior prior to any change in the market rules is necessary. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated. The proposed model enables the market regulators to make decision before implementing new market rules with the confidence of their results. To represent the effectiveness of the proposed method, a case study including wind power plants is considered and the impact of various market rules on players' behavior is simulated and discussed. Numerical studies indicate that simulating the strategic and collusive behavior prior to any change in the market rules is necessary. . [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.] In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated. The proposed model enables the market regulators to make decision before implementing new market rules with the confidence of their results. To represent the effectiveness of the proposed method, a case study including wind power plants is considered and the impact of various market rules on players’ behavior is simulated and discussed. Numerical studies indicate that simulating the strategic and collusive behavior prior to any change in the market rules is necessary. In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated. The proposed model enables the market regulators to make decision before implementing new market rules with the confidence of their results. To represent the effectiveness of the proposed method, a case study including wind power plants is considered and the impact of various market rules on players’ behavior is simulated and discussed. Numerical studies indicate that simulating the strategic and collusive behavior prior to any change in the market rules is necessary. •A virtual power market model is proposed using a heuristic dynamic game theory.•The proposed model can simulate the behavior of market players in a certain period.•This model can evaluate the oligopoly, collusive and strategic behavior of players.•The price uncertainty and security constraint are considered.•Neglecting strategic behavior of players can cause adverse consequences. In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach, strategic players are modeled in a multi-agent environment. These agents which are virtual representative of actual players forecast the prices and participate in the markets, exactly the same as real world situation. In addition, the role of ISO is encountered by using security constraint unit commitment (SCUC) and security constraint economic dispatch (SCED) solutions. Moreover, the interaction between market players is modeled using a heuristic dynamic game theory algorithm based on the supply function equilibria (SFE). In addition to the collusive behavior, using the proposed model, the short-term strategic behavior of players, which their effects will appear in long-term, can be simulated. The proposed model enables the market regulators to make decision before implementing new market rules with the confidence of their results. To represent the effectiveness of the proposed method, a case study including wind power plants is considered and the impact of various market rules on players' behavior is simulated and discussed. Numerical studies indicate that simulating the strategic and collusive behavior prior to any change in the market rules is necessary. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] All rights reserved, Elsevier
Author	Shafie-khah, Miadreza Sheikh-El-Eslami, Mohamad Kazem Parsa Moghaddam, Mohsen
Author_xml	– sequence: 1 givenname: Miadreza surname: Shafie-khah fullname: Shafie-khah, Miadreza email: m.shafie@modares.ac.ir – sequence: 2 givenname: Mohsen surname: Parsa Moghaddam fullname: Parsa Moghaddam, Mohsen email: parsa@modares.ac.ir – sequence: 3 givenname: Mohamad Kazem surname: Sheikh-El-Eslami fullname: Sheikh-El-Eslami, Mohamad Kazem email: aleslam@modares.ac.ir
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Keywords	Collusive behavior Virtual power market Strategic behavior Collusion Electricity Heuristic method Markets Regulation policy Modeling Game theory Agent oriented Firm strategy
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Snippet	In this paper, a virtual power market model is proposed to investigate the behavior of power market players from regulator's point of view. In this approach,...
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SubjectTerms	Agency theory algorithms Applied sciences Behavior Behavior modification Case studies Collusion Collusive behavior Constraints Decision-making Economic data Economic theory Effectiveness studies Electric energy Electric power plants Energy Energy economics Energy industry Energy market Energy policy Energy prices Exact sciences and technology Game theory General, economic and professional studies Heuristic Long term market power Markets Methodology. Modelling new markets Power Power plants Prices Regulation Security Strategic behavior Virtual power market Wind power
Title	Development of a virtual power market model to investigate strategic and collusive behavior of market players
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