Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games
► This paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. ► Two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. ► Pre-play communication has a signific...
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| Published in: | Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 81; no. 1; pp. 207 - 219 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier B.V
2012
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| ISSN: | 0167-2681, 1879-1751, 1879-1751 |
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| Abstract | ► This paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. ► Two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. ► Pre-play communication has a significantly lower impact on cooperation when intra-play communication is possible. ► The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities. |
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| AbstractList | It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities. All rights reserved, Elsevier It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities. ► This paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. ► Two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. ► Pre-play communication has a significantly lower impact on cooperation when intra-play communication is possible. ► The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities. It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities. |
| Author | Wengström, Erik Andersson, Ola |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Ola surname: Andersson fullname: Andersson, Ola email: ola.andersson@ifn.se organization: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden – sequence: 2 givenname: Erik surname: Wengström fullname: Wengström, Erik email: erik.wengstrom@econ.ku.dk organization: Department of Economics, Lund University and Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353, Copenhagen K, Denmark |
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| SubjectTerms | Communication Cooperation Economics Economics and Business Economics and Econometrics Ekonomi och näringsliv Experiments Game theory Messages Nationalekonomi Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Renegotiation Samhällsvetenskap Social Sciences |
| Title | Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games |
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