What's in a name? Anonymity and social distance in dictator and ultimatum games

The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants, yet many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete familiarity. When we are involved in interactive situations in the field, we usually have some clues concerning t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic behavior & organization Jg. 68; H. 1; S. 29 - 35
Hauptverfasser: Charness, Gary, Gneezy, Uri
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.10.2008
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Schriftenreihe:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Schlagworte:
Altruism
Anonymity
Charity
Dictators
Economic theory
Electronic commerce
Experiment
Experimental economics
Experiments
Familiarity
Game theory
Games
Generosity
Laboratories
Names
Social conditions & trends
Social distance
Social factors
Social interest
Strategic behaviour
Studies
D63
Names
Social distance
Generosity
A13
D64
Experiment
B49
C91
Altruism
ISSN:0167-2681, 1879-1751
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants, yet many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete familiarity. When we are involved in interactive situations in the field, we usually have some clues concerning the characteristics of others; however, in some environments (such as e-commerce) these clues may not be very substantial. How will people respond to varying degrees of anonymity and social distance? We consider the effect of one form of social distance on behavior by comparing the standard procedure of playing dictator and ultimatum games with the same games played by participants who knew the family name of their counterparts. When these names were revealed, dictators allocated a significantly larger portion of the pie. However, this information had no significant effect on the offers in the ultimatum game, as it appears that strategic considerations crowd out impulses toward generosity or charity.
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ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.001