Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game

We present a model of political campaigning where a candidate chooses between promoting oneself (positive campaign) or attacking the rival (negative campaign). Candidates vary only by quality. Campaign choices determine the subject of public deliberation: If a candidate runs a positive campaign and...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare Jg. 47; H. 3; S. 697 - 727
1. Verfasser:	Bhattacharya, Sourav
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.10.2016 Springer Berlin Heidelberg Springer Nature B.V
Schlagworte:	Advertisements Advertising Advertising campaigns Candidates Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Elections Electorate Game Theory International Political Economy Job hunting Median voter model Negative campaigning Original Paper Political advertising Political behavior Political campaigns Political candidates Political debate Political rhetoric Presidential elections Probability Psychological aspects Public Finance Rhetoric Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy Sociology Studies United States Voter behavior Voters Voting Voting behaviour Welfare United States > US Search Cost Negative Campaign Good Type Candidate Quality Median Voter
ISSN:	0176-1714, 1432-217X
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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