Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation

We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz's agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minim...

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Vydané v:	Biological cybernetics Ročník 102; číslo 3; s. 227 - 260
Hlavní autori:	Friston, Karl J, Daunizeau, Jean, Kilner, James, Kiebel, Stefan J
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Berlin/Heidelberg Berlin/Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag 01.03.2010 Springer-Verlag Springer Nature B.V
Predmet:	Afferent Pathways - physiology Animals Bayes Theorem Bayesian Bayesian analysis Behavior - physiology Bioinformatics Biomedical and Life Sciences Biomedicine Brain Brain - physiology Complex Systems Computational Computer Appl. in Life Sciences Computer Simulation Control Cybernetics Energy Entropy Hierarchical Humans Learning - physiology Models, Neurological Motor Motor ability Motor Activity - physiology Neurobiology Neurosciences Original Paper Perception - physiology Priors Sensory perception Hierarchical Control Priors Motor Computational Bayesian
ISSN:	0340-1200, 1432-0770, 1432-0770
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Popis
Shrnutí:	We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz's agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound. It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking. In particular, it suggests that motor control can be understood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptive sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a simple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these points using simulations of oculomotor control and then apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed movements. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in an intimate relationship with perception.
Bibliografia:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00422-010-0364-z ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2 ObjectType-Feature-1
ISSN:	0340-1200 1432-0770 1432-0770
DOI:	10.1007/s00422-010-0364-z