Do people make decisions under risk based on ignorance? An empirical test of the priority heuristic against cumulative prospect theory

Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig [Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The Priority Heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113(2), 409–432] put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. Accord...

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Vydané v:	Organizational behavior and human decision processes Ročník 107; číslo 1; s. 75 - 95
Hlavní autori:	Glöckner, Andreas, Betsch, Tilmann
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Amsterdam Elsevier Inc 01.09.2008 Elsevier Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
Edícia:	Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Predmet:	Biological and medical sciences Bounded rationality Cognition. Intelligence Cumulative prospect theory Decision latency Decision making Decision making models Decision making. Choice Decision strategy Decisions Expected utility Fast and frugal heuristics Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Heuristic Heuristics Ignorance Individual behaviour Information Organizational behaviour Predictions Priorities Process tracing Prospect theory Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology Risk theory Risks Studies Variables Decision latency Fast and frugal heuristics Cumulative prospect theory Decision strategy Process tracing Bounded rationality Human Rational irrational Decision making Theory Heuristics Risk Experimental study Strategy
ISSN:	0749-5978, 1095-9920
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Shrnutí:	Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig [Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The Priority Heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113(2), 409–432] put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), but use information in a non-compensatory manner and ignore information. We conducted three studies to test the PH empirically by analyzing individual choice patterns, decision times and information search parameters in diagnostic decision tasks. Results on all three dependent variables conflict with the predictions of the PH and can be better explained by the CPT. The predictive accuracy of the PH was high for decision tasks in which the predictions align with the predictions of the CPT but very low for decision tasks in which this was not the case. The findings indicate that earlier results supporting the PH might have been caused by the selection of decision tasks that were not diagnostic for the PH as compared to CPT.
Bibliografia:	SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2
ISSN:	0749-5978 1095-9920
DOI:	10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.02.003