A coalition formation value for games in partition function form

► a value suited to coalition formation for games with externalities. ► The value is an average of marginal contribution of players in scenarios. ► The classical Shapley value and the de Clippel–Serrano value can be recovered. The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be a...

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Vydáno v:	European journal of operational research Ročník 221; číslo 1; s. 175 - 185
Hlavní autoři:	Grabisch, Michel, Funaki, Yukihiko
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 16.08.2012 Elsevier Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Témata:	Applied sciences Associations Coalition formation Coalitions Computer Science Computer Science and Game Theory Discrete Mathematics Economic models Economics Economics and Finance Exact sciences and technology Externalities Externality Game theory Games Games in partition function form Humanities and Social Sciences Mathematical models Operational research Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Operations Research Partitions Players Shapley value Studies Coalition formation Games in partition function form Shapley value Game theory Partition Script Game value Externality Surplus Economy Partition function Coalition Cooperative game games in partition function form coalition formation game theory
ISSN:	0377-2217, 1872-6860
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
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