A coalition formation value for games in partition function form

► a value suited to coalition formation for games with externalities. ► The value is an average of marginal contribution of players in scenarios. ► The classical Shapley value and the de Clippel–Serrano value can be recovered. The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be a...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:European journal of operational research Jg. 221; H. 1; S. 175 - 185
Hauptverfasser: Grabisch, Michel, Funaki, Yukihiko
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 16.08.2012
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Schlagworte:
Applied sciences
Associations
Coalition formation
Coalitions
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
Discrete Mathematics
Economic models
Economics
Economics and Finance
Exact sciences and technology
Externalities
Externality
Game theory
Games
Games in partition function form
Humanities and Social Sciences
Mathematical models
Operational research
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Operations Research
Partitions
Players
Shapley value
Studies
Coalition formation
Games in partition function form
Shapley value
Game theory
Partition
Script
Game value
Externality
Surplus
Economy
Partition function
Coalition
Cooperative game
games in partition function form
coalition formation
game theory
ISSN:0377-2217, 1872-6860
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:► a value suited to coalition formation for games with externalities. ► The value is an average of marginal contribution of players in scenarios. ► The classical Shapley value and the de Clippel–Serrano value can be recovered. The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.
Bibliographie:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0377-2217
1872-6860
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.036