Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions

In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decisio...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of economic perspectives Jg. 26; H. 3; S. 157 - 176
Hauptverfasser: Charness, Gary, Sutter, Matthias
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Nashville American Economic Association 01.07.2012
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ISSN:0895-3309, 1944-7965
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less “behavioral” than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation.
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ISSN:0895-3309
1944-7965
DOI:10.1257/jep.26.3.157