A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 114; no. 10; pp. E2016 - E2025
Main Authors: LeDoux, Joseph E, Brown, Richard
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: United States 07.03.2017
Subjects:
Amygdala - anatomy & histology
Amygdala - physiology
Awareness - physiology
Cognition - physiology
Consciousness - physiology
Fear - physiology
Fear - psychology
Humans
Memory, Short-Term - physiology
Visual Cortex - anatomy & histology
Visual Cortex - physiology
self
amygdala
introspection
working memory
fear
ISSN:1091-6490
Online Access:Get more information
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Summary:Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.
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ISSN:1091-6490
DOI:10.1073/pnas.1619316114