On time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time
In this paper, which is a continuation of the discrete-time paper (Björk and Murgoci in Finance Stoch. 18:545–592, 2004 ), we study a class of continuous-time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle....
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| Vydáno v: | Finance and stochastics Ročník 21; číslo 2; s. 331 - 360 |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , , |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Berlin/Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
01.04.2017
Springer Nature B.V |
| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 0949-2984, 1432-1122 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | In this paper, which is a continuation of the discrete-time paper (Björk and Murgoci in Finance Stoch. 18:545–592,
2004
), we study a class of continuous-time stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game-theoretic framework, and we look for Nash subgame perfect equilibrium points. For a general controlled continuous-time Markov process and a fairly general objective functional, we derive an extension of the standard Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation, in the form of a system of nonlinear equations, for the determination of the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function. The main theoretical result is a verification theorem. As an application of the general theory, we study a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic regulator. We also present a study of time-inconsistency within the framework of a general equilibrium production economy of Cox–Ingersoll–Ross type (Cox et al. in Econometrica 53:363–384,
1985
). |
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| Bibliografie: | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 0949-2984 1432-1122 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00780-017-0327-5 |