Efficient earmarking under decentralized fiscal commitments

Earmarked federal grants are ubiquitous and significant. Traditional fiscal federalism is unable to explain these grants’ widespread utilization. Recent arguments focusing on the potential benefits of centralized earmarking in reducing incentives for the creation of soft budgets at subcentral govern...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	International tax and public finance Vol. 22; no. 4; pp. 683 - 701
Main Author:	Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	New York Springer US 01.08.2015 Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:	Budgets Business Taxation/Tax Law Centralization Consumption Decentralization Economics Economics and Finance Expenditures Federalism Fiscal federalism Fiscal policy Government grants Government spending Income redistribution Public Finance Public good Public goods Regional government Regions Studies Soft budgets D62 Decentralized fiscal commitments R5 H41 H77 Earmarked grants Selective decentralized leadership C72
ISSN:	0927-5940, 1573-6970
Online Access:	Get full text
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