Sustainable reputations with rating systems

In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, w...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic theory Jg. 146; H. 2; S. 479 - 503
1. Verfasser:	Ekmekci, Mehmet
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	New York Elsevier Inc 01.03.2011 Elsevier Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
Schriftenreihe:	Journal of Economic Theory
Schlagworte:	Ankündigungseffekt Announcements Auctions Business reputation Buyers Disappearing reputations E-Business Economic theory Electronic commerce Game theory Games Konsumentenverhalten Mapping Online reputation mechanisms Past Pay-off Payoffs Permanent reputations Probability Rating systems Ratings & rankings Reputation Reputations Reputations Rating systems Online reputation mechanisms Disappearing reputations Permanent reputations Search engines Shopping Signal processing Signalling Spieltheorie Strategic behaviour Studies Theorie Rating systems Reputations Disappearing reputations D82 Online reputation mechanisms Permanent reputations
ISSN:	0022-0531, 1095-7235
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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