Sustainable reputations with rating systems

In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, w...

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Published in:	Journal of economic theory Vol. 146; no. 2; pp. 479 - 503
Main Author:	Ekmekci, Mehmet
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	New York Elsevier Inc 01.03.2011 Elsevier Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
Series:	Journal of Economic Theory
Subjects:	Ankündigungseffekt Announcements Auctions Business reputation Buyers Disappearing reputations E-Business Economic theory Electronic commerce Game theory Games Konsumentenverhalten Mapping Online reputation mechanisms Past Pay-off Payoffs Permanent reputations Probability Rating systems Ratings & rankings Reputation Reputations Reputations Rating systems Online reputation mechanisms Disappearing reputations Permanent reputations Search engines Shopping Signal processing Signalling Spieltheorie Strategic behaviour Studies Theorie Rating systems Reputations Disappearing reputations D82 Online reputation mechanisms Permanent reputations
ISSN:	0022-0531, 1095-7235
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Abstract	In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system. We show that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that, the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his Stackelberg payoff after every history. This is in contrast to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) [5], where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals. We also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers, while decreasing the sellerʼs payoff.
AbstractList	In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system. We show that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that, the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his Stackelberg payoff after every history. This is in contrast to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) [5], where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals. We also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers, while decreasing the seller's payoff. All rights reserved, Elsevier In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system. We show that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that, the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his Stackelberg payoff after every history. This is in contrast to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) [5], where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals. We also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers, while decreasing the seller[modifier letter apostrophe]s payoff. In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system. We show that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that, the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his Stackelberg payoff after every history. This is in contrast to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004) [5], where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals. We also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers, while decreasing the sellerʼs payoff. In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions (e.g. eBay), online shopping search engines (e.g. BizRate.com) and consumer reports, we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals, and makes public announcements every period. The set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system. We show that, absent reputation effects, information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs. However, if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period, then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that, the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his Stackelberg payoff after every history. This is in contrast to Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals. We also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers, while decreasing the seller's payoff. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Author	Ekmekci, Mehmet
Author_xml	– sequence: 1 givenname: Mehmet surname: Ekmekci fullname: Ekmekci, Mehmet email: m-ekmekci@northwestern.edu organization: Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, MEDS, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, United States
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SubjectTerms	Ankündigungseffekt Announcements Auctions Business reputation Buyers Disappearing reputations E-Business Economic theory Electronic commerce Game theory Games Konsumentenverhalten Mapping Online reputation mechanisms Past Pay-off Payoffs Permanent reputations Probability Rating systems Ratings & rankings Reputation Reputations Reputations Rating systems Online reputation mechanisms Disappearing reputations Permanent reputations Search engines Shopping Signal processing Signalling Spieltheorie Strategic behaviour Studies Theorie
Title	Sustainable reputations with rating systems
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