Participation

We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) whe...

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Veröffentlicht in:The American economic review Jg. 101; H. 4; S. 1211 - 1237
Hauptverfasser: Charness, Gary, Dufwenberg, Martin
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Nashville American Economic Association 01.06.2011
American Economic Assoc
Schlagworte:
Ability
Access to information
Asymmetrische Information
Behavior
Behavior modeling
Behavioural economics
Blame
Collaboration
Communication
Communication economics
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Business
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Emotions
Employment
Experimental economics
Game theory
Games
Guilt
Human capital
Information economics
Kommunikation
Lying
Observed choices
Opportunistic behavior
Participation
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Spieltheorie
Studies
Talent agents & managers
Talent management
Theorie
Truth
Verhaltensökonomik
ISSN:0002-8282, 1944-7981
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-from-blame.
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.101.4.1211