Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts
Modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth. It is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output. The...
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| Published in: | The Rand journal of economics Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 78 - 100 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Mount Morris, Ill
Rand
01.04.1993
The RAND Corporation Rand Corp Rand Corporation |
| Series: | RAND Journal of Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| ISSN: | 0741-6261, 1756-2171 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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