Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowin...

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Vydané v:Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Ročník 9; číslo 3; s. 265 - 279
Hlavní autori: Cinyabuguma, Matthias, Page, Talbot, Putterman, Louis
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: New York Springer 01.09.2006
Springer Nature B.V
Edícia:Experimental Economics
Predmet:
Behavioral sciences
Collective action
Cooperation
Economic behaviour
Economic incentives
Economic theory
Efficiency
Experiment
Experiments
Free riding
Group decision making
Incentives
Microeconomics
Public good
Public goods
Punishment
Studies
ISSN:1386-4157, 1573-6938
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Shrnutí:Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced.
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ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z