Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control

We review a theory of homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control within the Active Inference framework. Our aim is to connect two research streams that are usually considered independently; namely, Active Inference and associative learning theories of animal behaviour. The former uses a...

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Vydané v:Progress in neurobiology Ročník 134; s. 17 - 35
Hlavní autori: Pezzulo, Giovanni, Rigoli, Francesco, Friston, Karl
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: England Pergamon Press 01.11.2015
Predmet:
Animals
Association Learning - physiology
Behavior - physiology
Brain - physiology
Homeostasis - physiology
Humans
Models, Neurological
Models, Psychological
Pavlovian control
Active Inference
Homeostatic regulation
Adaptive control
Model-based control
Model-free control
ISSN:0301-0082, 1873-5118
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Popis
Shrnutí:We review a theory of homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control within the Active Inference framework. Our aim is to connect two research streams that are usually considered independently; namely, Active Inference and associative learning theories of animal behaviour. The former uses a probabilistic (Bayesian) formulation of perception and action, while the latter calls on multiple (Pavlovian, habitual, goal-directed) processes for homeostatic and behavioural control. We offer a synthesis these classical processes and cast them as successive hierarchical contextualisations of sensorimotor constructs, using the generative models that underpin Active Inference. This dissolves any apparent mechanistic distinction between the optimization processes that mediate classical control or learning. Furthermore, we generalize the scope of Active Inference by emphasizing interoceptive inference and homeostatic regulation. The ensuing homeostatic (or allostatic) perspective provides an intuitive explanation for how priors act as drives or goals to enslave action, and emphasises the embodied nature of inference.
Bibliografia:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-3
content type line 23
ObjectType-Review-1
ISSN:0301-0082
1873-5118
DOI:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001