Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie

This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the high...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review Vol. 108; no. 2; pp. 419 - 453
Main Authors: Gneezy, Uri, Kajackaite, Agne, Sobel, Joel
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Nashville American Economic Association 01.02.2018
American Economic Assoc
Subjects:
Behavior
Lying
strategic communication
ISSN:0002-8282, 1944-7981
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes than when the experimenter can verify the observed outcome. Partial lying increases when the prior probability of the highest outcome decreases.
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.20161553