Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory

Influential dual process models of human thinking posit that reasoners typically produce a fast, intuitive heuristic (i.e., Type-1) response which might subsequently be overridden and corrected by slower, deliberative processing (i.e., Type-2). In this study we directly tested this time course assum...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cognition Vol. 158; pp. 90 - 109
Main Authors: Bago, Bence, De Neys, Wim
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Netherlands Elsevier B.V 01.01.2017
Elsevier Science Ltd
Elsevier
Subjects:
Adult
Cognition & reasoning
Conflict (Psychology)
Conflict detection
Cues
Decision Making
Dual process theory
Economics and Finance
Experiments
Female
Heuristic
Heuristics
Humanities and Social Sciences
Humans
Information processing
Latency
Male
Middle Aged
Models, Psychological
Reasoning
Response time
Studies
Time course
Time Factors
Conflict detection
Reasoning
Dual process theory
ISSN:0010-0277, 1873-7838, 1873-7838
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Influential dual process models of human thinking posit that reasoners typically produce a fast, intuitive heuristic (i.e., Type-1) response which might subsequently be overridden and corrected by slower, deliberative processing (i.e., Type-2). In this study we directly tested this time course assumption. We used a two response paradigm in which participants have to give an immediate answer and afterwards are allowed extra time before giving a final response. In four experiments we used a range of procedures (e.g., challenging response deadline, concurrent load) to knock out Type 2 processing and make sure that the initial response was intuitive in nature. Our key finding is that we frequently observe correct, logical responses as the first, immediate response. Response confidence and latency analyses indicate that these initial correct responses are given fast, with high confidence, and in the face of conflicting heuristic responses. Findings suggest that fast and automatic Type 1 processing also cues a correct logical response from the start. We sketch a revised dual process model in which the relative strength of different types of intuitions determines reasoning performance.
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ISSN:0010-0277
1873-7838
1873-7838
DOI:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014