Circular causality in volition

Conventional scientific paradigms predominantly emphasize upward causality, often overlooking or dismissing the role of downward causality. This approach is also prevalent in neuroscience, where cortical neurodynamics and higher cognitive functions are typically viewed as consequences of neuronal or...

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Published in:Frontiers in network physiology Vol. 5; p. 1631899
Main Author: Liljenström, Hans
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Switzerland Frontiers Media S.A 2025
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ISSN:2674-0109, 2674-0109
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Conventional scientific paradigms predominantly emphasize upward causality, often overlooking or dismissing the role of downward causality. This approach is also prevalent in neuroscience, where cortical neurodynamics and higher cognitive functions are typically viewed as consequences of neuronal or even ion channel activity. Conversely, mental phenomena are generally assumed to lack causal efficacy over neural processes—an assumption that is increasingly being questioned. The causality associated with volition may be analyzed at three organizational levels: (1) neuronal interactions within cortical networks, (2) interregional dynamics between distinct brain areas, and (3) the reciprocal relationship between the nervous system and its environmental context. Across all these domains, circular rather than strictly linear causality appears to be at play. This paper examines the implications of such circular causality for volition and the longstanding problem of free will, with particular reference to insights derived from neurocomputational modeling.
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Reviewed by: Peter Erdi, Kalamazoo College, United States
Edited by: Eckehard Schöll, Technical University of Berlin, Germany
Hans Albert Braun, University of Marburg, Germany
ISSN:2674-0109
2674-0109
DOI:10.3389/fnetp.2025.1631899