The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets

In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the economic challenges of the platform economy. We argue that both the general and platformspecific assaults on the CW standard are misguided, tha...

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Published in:	Review of industrial organization Vol. 54; no. 4; pp. 741 - 774
Main Authors:	Melamed, A. Douglas, Petit, Nicolas
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	New York Springer Science + Business Media 01.06.2019 Springer US Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:	Antitrust laws Assaults Competition Consumerism Economics Economics and Finance Industrial Organization Labor market Markets Microeconomics Political power Politics Social networks Welfare Consumer welfare Competition Platforms Market power Monopoly Antitrust
ISSN:	0889-938X, 1573-7160
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Abstract	In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the economic challenges of the platform economy. We argue that both the general and platformspecific assaults on the CW standard are misguided, that the CW standard is capable of addressing the economic concerns that critics have raised, and that the proposed alternatives would make things worse—not better.
AbstractList	In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the economic challenges of the platform economy. We argue that both the general and platformspecific assaults on the CW standard are misguided, that the CW standard is capable of addressing the economic concerns that critics have raised, and that the proposed alternatives would make things worse—not better. In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the economic challenges of the platform economy. We argue that both the general and platform-specific assaults on the CW standard are misguided, that the CW standard is capable of addressing the economic concerns that critics have raised, and that the proposed alternatives would make things worse—not better.
Author	Melamed, A. Douglas Petit, Nicolas
Author_xml	– sequence: 1 givenname: A. Douglas surname: Melamed fullname: Melamed, A. Douglas – sequence: 2 givenname: Nicolas surname: Petit fullname: Petit, Nicolas
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Cites_doi	10.5089/9781484361672.001 10.2139/ssrn.2384182 10.3386/w23687 10.2139/ssrn.3083114 10.2307/1885117 10.1086/260357 10.2307/1926047 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0007 10.1093/joclec/nhs031 10.2139/ssrn.3046302 10.2139/ssrn.3124356 10.7208/chicago/9780226675787.001.0001 10.2139/ssrn.2490525 10.1257/jep.31.3.113 10.1093/jeclap/lpy020 10.2307/3003070 10.1086/466617 10.3386/w24700 10.2307/796417 10.2307/2967480 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.001 10.2307/3480652
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Snippet	In this paper, we discuss whether the consumer welfare (CW) standard needs to be replaced or revised in order for antitrust law to deal effectively with the...
SourceID	proquest crossref springer jstor
SourceType	Aggregation Database Enrichment Source Index Database Publisher
StartPage	741
SubjectTerms	Antitrust laws Assaults Competition Consumerism Economics Economics and Finance Industrial Organization Labor market Markets Microeconomics Political power Politics Social networks Welfare
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Title	The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets
URI	https://www.jstor.org/stable/48702973 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11151-019-09688-4 https://www.proquest.com/docview/2178455561
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