Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority c...

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Vydané v:	Social choice and welfare Ročník 51; číslo 3; s. 513 - 550
Hlavní autori:	Faliszewski, Piotr, Skowron, Piotr, Slinko, Arkadii, Talmon, Nimrod
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.10.2018 Springer Berlin Heidelberg Springer Nature B.V
Predmet:	Algorithms Committees Counting Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory International Political Economy Majority rule Original Paper Public Finance Rules Scores Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy
ISSN:	0176-1714, 1432-217X
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