Rhetoric, Reality, and Reputation Do CSR and Political Lobbying Protect Shareholder Wealth against Environmental Lawsuits?

We investigate whether firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputations and environmental lobbying efforts protect shareholder wealth in the event of environmental lawsuits. Using a sample of lawsuits filed in United States Federal Courts, we find that firms with superior CSR reputation...

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Vydáno v:Journal of financial and quantitative analysis Ročník 55; číslo 2; s. 679 - 706
Hlavní autoři: Liu, Chelsea, Cheong, Chee Seng, Zurbruegg, Ralf
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Seattle Cambridge University Press 01.03.2020
Témata:
Alternative approaches
Courts
Emissions
Environmental impact
Environmental policy
Expenditures
Falsification
Fines & penalties
Greenhouse gases
Hypotheses
Insurance
Litigation
Lobbying
Oil spills
Politics
Propensity
Quantitative analysis
Reputations
Rhetoric
Shareholders wealth
Social responsibility
Stockholders
Valuation
Wealth
ISSN:0022-1090, 1756-6916
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Shrnutí:We investigate whether firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputations and environmental lobbying efforts protect shareholder wealth in the event of environmental lawsuits. Using a sample of lawsuits filed in United States Federal Courts, we find that firms with superior CSR reputations suffer worse market reactions to environmental allegations. In contrast, lobbying cushions filing-date valuation losses, providing insurance-like protection against lawsuits. Our results are robust to subsample analyses, a falsification test, propensity score matching, and alternative empirical proxies and model specifications.
Bibliografie:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:0022-1090
1756-6916
DOI:10.1017/S0022109019000073