The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures
Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs, salient labels yield frequent coordination. However, given even minutely asymmetric payoffs, labels lose much of their...
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| Vydané v: | The American economic review Ročník 98; číslo 4; s. 1443 - 1458 |
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| Hlavní autori: | , , |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydavateľské údaje: |
Nashville
American Economic Association
01.09.2008
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| Predmet: | |
| ISSN: | 0002-8282, 1944-7981 |
| On-line prístup: | Získať plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs, salient labels yield frequent coordination. However, given even minutely asymmetric payoffs, labels lose much of their effectiveness and miscoordination abounds. This raises questions about the extent to which the effectiveness of focal points based on label salience persists beyond the special case of symmetric games. The patterns of miscoordination we observe vary with the magnitude of payoff differences in intricate ways that suggest nonequilibrium accounts based on "level-k" thinking and "team reasoning." |
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| Bibliografia: | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.98.4.1443 |