Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty

Transboundary pollution poses a major threat to environment and human health. An effective approach to addressing this problem is the adoption of long-term abatement technology; however, many developing regions are lacking in related technologies that can be acquired by licensing from developed regi...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Computational economics Jg. 61; H. 3; S. 905 - 935
Hauptverfasser:	Xu, Hao, Tan, Deqing
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	New York Springer US 01.03.2023 Springer Springer Nature B.V
Schlagworte:	Adoption of innovations Air pollution Analysis Behavioral/Experimental Economics Climate change Computer Appl. in Social and Behavioral Sciences Control theory Cooperation Costs (Law) Differential games Economic models Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Emissions Environmental tax Equilibrium Fees & charges Game theory Industrialized nations Licenses Licensing Licensing (technology) Math Applications in Computer Science Operations Research/Decision Theory Optimization Pollutants Pollution Regions Revenue Royalty Taxation Technology Technology transfer Transboundary pollution Royalty licensing Transboundary pollution Fixed-fee licensing Abatement technology Differential games
ISSN:	0927-7099, 1572-9974
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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