Xu, H., & Tan, D. (2023). Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty. Computational economics, 61(3), 905-935. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-019-09909-8
Citácia podle Chicago (17th ed.)Xu, Hao, a Deqing Tan. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty." Computational Economics 61, no. 3 (2023): 905-935. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-019-09909-8.
Citácia podľa MLA (8th ed.)Xu, Hao, a Deqing Tan. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty." Computational Economics, vol. 61, no. 3, 2023, pp. 905-935, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-019-09909-8.
Upozornenie: Tieto citáce sú generované automaticky. Nemusia byť úplne správne podľa citačných pravidiel..