How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?

This paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis-specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of Medicare admissions. I find hospitals responded primarily by "upcoding" patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	The American economic review Jg. 95; H. 5; S. 1525 - 1547
1. Verfasser:	Dafny, Leemore S
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	United States American Economic Association 01.12.2005
Schlagworte:	Business economics Changes Diagnosis-Related Groups - economics Economic analysis Economics, Hospital Health care Health care payments Health economics Health policy Hospital admissions Hospital costs Hospital management Hospitalization Hospitals Hospitals, Private - economics Hospitals, Public - economics Hospitals, Voluntary - economics Humans Hypotheses Impact analysis Incentives Insurance, Health, Reimbursement - economics Legal aspects Legal reform Medical diagnosis Medicare Mortality Nonprofit hospitals Patients Physicians Policy making Price changes Price increases Price level Price level changes Prices Private sector Profits Prospective Payment System - economics Prospective payment systems Quality of care Quality standards Reforms Reimbursement Studies Teaching hospitals U.S.A United States United States > US
ISSN:	0002-8282, 1944-7981
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	This paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis-specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of Medicare admissions. I find hospitals responded primarily by "upcoding" patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price increases. This response was particularly strong among far-profit hospitals. I find little evidence hospitals increased the volume of admissions differentially for diagnoses subject to the largest price increases, despite the financial incentive to do so. Neither did they increase intensity or quality of care in these diagnoses, suggesting hospitals do not compete for patients at the diagnosis level.
Bibliographie:	SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-2
ISSN:	0002-8282 1944-7981
DOI:	10.1257/000282805775014236