Old, not odd: Running laches against the states and the future of antitrust after 'New York v. Meta Platforms'

In 'New York v Meta Platforms, Inc' the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit applied equitable laches to an antitrust lawsuit brought by 46 state attorneys general, holding that they had not brought their claims in their role as law enforcers. 'Meta Platforms' is t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Michigan law review Vol. 123; no. 1; pp. 111 - 144
Main Author: Schulze, Frank
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Ann Arbor, MI United States University of Michigan Law School 01.10.2024
Michigan Law Review Association
Subjects:
Antitrust law
Antitrust laws
Attorneys general
Civil procedure
Compromise and settlement
Consolidation and merger of corporations
Damages
Enforcement
Equitable remedies
Evaluation
Injunctions
Interstate commerce
Judges & magistrates
Law enforcement
Laws, regulations and rules
Limitation of actions
Monopolies
Powers and duties
Right of action
State action (Antitrust law)
UNITED STATES
New York
United States > US
ISSN:0026-2234, 1939-8557
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:In 'New York v Meta Platforms, Inc' the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit applied equitable laches to an antitrust lawsuit brought by 46 state attorneys general, holding that they had not brought their claims in their role as law enforcers. 'Meta Platforms' is the latest in a line of cases that has characterized antitrust actions by state attorneys general as non-public and non-governmental. But this characterization is in tension with the historical role of state attorneys general in enforcing the antitrust laws and undermines the original design of the federal antitrust statutes as supplements to state enforcement activities. This note argues that state antitrust enforcement is an insurance policy against federal underenforcement and a mechanism to reflect the popular will. The 'Meta Platforms' decision observed that the status of the states as plaintiffs independently factors into the court's laches analysis. This observation - which this note calls "the states factor" - suggests that all else equal, a suit brought by the states to vindicate a quasi-sovereign interest on behalf of its citizens is less likely to be stale than a similar one from a purely private actor. If courts afford limited weight to the "states factor" and run laches against elected antitrust enforcers, they make the federal statutes less efficient for their original purpose of supplementing state enforcement activity.
Bibliography:MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 123, No. 1, Dec 2024, 111-144
Informit, Melbourne (Vic)
ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:0026-2234
1939-8557
DOI:10.36644/mlr.123.1.old