Cooperation for reputation: Wasteful contributions as costly signals in public goods

Why do people persistently contribute to public goods and does it matter to them if their donation makes a difference? A costly signalling perspective suggests that donors might be more concerned about their reputation than the utility of their helping act. We report data on two step-level public go...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Group processes & intergroup relations Vol. 13; no. 1; pp. 101 - 111
Main Authors:	Van Vugt, Mark, Hardy, Charlotte L.
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	London, England SAGE Publications 01.01.2010 Sage Publications Ltd
Subjects:	Altruism Cooperation Donations Donors Experiments Prestige Public good Public goods Reputations Self Self interest Selfpresentation Social research United Kingdom > UK costly signalling reputations social dilemmas public goods self-presentation conspicuous cooperation competitive altruism
ISSN:	1368-4302, 1461-7188
Online Access:	Get full text
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