Cooperation for reputation: Wasteful contributions as costly signals in public goods

Why do people persistently contribute to public goods and does it matter to them if their donation makes a difference? A costly signalling perspective suggests that donors might be more concerned about their reputation than the utility of their helping act. We report data on two step-level public go...

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Vydáno v:Group processes & intergroup relations Ročník 13; číslo 1; s. 101 - 111
Hlavní autoři: Van Vugt, Mark, Hardy, Charlotte L.
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: London, England SAGE Publications 01.01.2010
Sage Publications Ltd
Témata:
Altruism
Cooperation
Donations
Donors
Experiments
Prestige
Public good
Public goods
Reputations
Self
Self interest
Selfpresentation
Social research
United Kingdom > UK
costly signalling
reputations
social dilemmas
public goods
self-presentation
conspicuous cooperation
competitive altruism
ISSN:1368-4302, 1461-7188
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Shrnutí:Why do people persistently contribute to public goods and does it matter to them if their donation makes a difference? A costly signalling perspective suggests that donors might be more concerned about their reputation than the utility of their helping act. We report data on two step-level public goods experiments. We find that in public (vs. private) conditions, contributions go up even when the public good is already provided (Experiment 1) or is unattainable (Experiment 2). Furthermore, these conspicuous donations appear to enhance the status and prestige of the donor because they signal some hidden quality. This research suggests that a public good contribution can be a self-presentation strategy and that the benefits of these contributions to society are sometimes of secondary importance.
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ISSN:1368-4302
1461-7188
DOI:10.1177/1368430209342258