Network Structural Vulnerability: A Multiobjective Attacker Perspective

In this paper, we provide a novel framework to assess the vulnerability/robustness of a network with respect to pair-wise nodes' connectivity. In particular, we consider attackers that aim, at the same time, at dealing the maximum possible damage to the network in terms of the residual connecti...

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Vydáno v:IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems Ročník 49; číslo 10; s. 2036 - 2049
Hlavní autoři: Faramondi, Luca, Oliva, Gabriele, Panzieri, Stefano, Pascucci, Federica, Schlueter, Martin, Munetomo, Masaharu, Setola, Roberto
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York IEEE 01.10.2019
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Témata:
Area measurement
Area measurement; Attacker behavior; critical infrastructures; critical node detection; Cybernetics; Frequency measurement; Indexes; network robustness; Optimization; Robustness; Software; Control and Systems Engineering; Human-Computer Interaction; Computer Science Applications1707 Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition; Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Attacker behavior
critical infrastructures
critical node detection
Cybernetics
Formulations
Frequency measurement
Indexes
Multiple objective analysis
network robustness
Nodes
Optimization
Robustness
ISSN:2168-2216, 2168-2232
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Shrnutí:In this paper, we provide a novel framework to assess the vulnerability/robustness of a network with respect to pair-wise nodes' connectivity. In particular, we consider attackers that aim, at the same time, at dealing the maximum possible damage to the network in terms of the residual connectivity after the attack and at keeping the cost of the attack (e.g., the number of attacked nodes) at a minimum. Differently from the previous literature, we consider the attacker perspective using a multiobjective formulation and, rather than making hypotheses on the mindset of the attacker in terms of a particular tradeoff between the objectives, we consider the entire Pareto front of nondominated solutions. Based on that, we define novel global and local robustness/vulnerability indicators and we show that such indices can be the base for the implementation of effective protection strategies. Specifically, we propose two different problem formulations and we assess their performances. We conclude this paper by analyzing, as case studies, the IEEE118 power network and the U.S. Airline Network as it was in 1997, comparing the proposed approach against centrality measures.
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ISSN:2168-2216
2168-2232
DOI:10.1109/TSMC.2018.2790438