Informational Nudges and Environmental Preferences in a Public Goods Game in Networks

Using a framed lab experiment, we test whether the efficiency of a pro-environmental informational nudge (disclosure of the socially optimal level of investment) depends on subjects’ environmental preferences and on the type of network they belong to. We observe a higher coordination on the socially...

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Vydáno v:Environmental modeling & assessment Ročník 29; číslo 4; s. 701 - 722
Hlavní autoři: Ouvrard, Benjamin, Stenger, Anne
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Cham Springer International Publishing 01.08.2024
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Témata:
Applications of Mathematics
Cooperation
Earth and Environmental Science
Environment
Experiments
Games
Investments
Math. Appl. in Environmental Science
Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics
Networks
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Public good
public services and goods
Quantitative Finance
Networks
Inequity aversion
Environmental sensitivity
H41
Nudge
Public goods experiment
C91
Q50
C72
ISSN:1420-2026, 1573-2967
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Shrnutí:Using a framed lab experiment, we test whether the efficiency of a pro-environmental informational nudge (disclosure of the socially optimal level of investment) depends on subjects’ environmental preferences and on the type of network they belong to. We observe a higher coordination on the socially optimal profile of investments in the circle network (everyone has the same number of neighbors), but only with the most sensitive subjects to environmental matters. In star networks (some have more neighbors than the other members), we find evidence that the nudge can even induce a decrease in the level of investments for the least sensitive subjects. Thus, nudges should be aimed at individuals with high environmental sensitivity in networks favoring uniform behavior.
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ISSN:1420-2026
1573-2967
DOI:10.1007/s10666-023-09951-9