Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

We consider the design of dominant strategy incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions for an indivisible good, when bidders' values are drawn from a correlated distribution. For independent distributions, Myerson showed that the optimal auction for risk-neutral bidders remains incentive...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Games and economic behavior Vol. 92; pp. 349 - 369
Main Authors:	Dobzinski, Shahar, Fu, Hu, Kleinberg, Robert
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.07.2015 Academic Press
Subjects:	Algorithms Approximation Algorithms Attitudes Auctions Bayesian mechanism design Bidders Game theory Incentives Probability distribution Profit maximization Revenue Risk Risk assessment Studies Time Bayesian mechanism design Approximation Algorithms D82
ISSN:	0899-8256, 1090-2473
Online Access:	Get full text
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Be the first to leave a comment!