Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

We consider the design of dominant strategy incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions for an indivisible good, when bidders' values are drawn from a correlated distribution. For independent distributions, Myerson showed that the optimal auction for risk-neutral bidders remains incentive...

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Vydané v:	Games and economic behavior Ročník 92; s. 349 - 369
Hlavní autori:	Dobzinski, Shahar, Fu, Hu, Kleinberg, Robert
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.07.2015 Academic Press
Predmet:	Algorithms Approximation Algorithms Attitudes Auctions Bayesian mechanism design Bidders Game theory Incentives Probability distribution Profit maximization Revenue Risk Risk assessment Studies Time Bayesian mechanism design Approximation Algorithms D82
ISSN:	0899-8256, 1090-2473
On-line prístup:	Získať plný text
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