Self-confidence and strategic behavior

We suggest that overconfidence (conscious or unconscious) is motivated in part by strategic considerations, and test this experimentally. We find compelling supporting evidence in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on...

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Vydáno v:Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Ročník 21; číslo 1; s. 72 - 98
Hlavní autoři: Charness, Gary, Rustichini, Aldo, van de Ven, Jeroen
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York Springer US 01.03.2018
Springer Nature B.V
Témata:
Behavior
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Competition
Confidence
Deterrence
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Intelligence tests
Microeconomics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
Tournaments
Unconsciousness
A12
Strategic deterrence
Experiment
D03
Self-confidence
Self-deception
C91
Unconscious behavior
Overconfidence
Luring
D82
ISSN:1386-4157, 1573-6938
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Popis
Shrnutí:We suggest that overconfidence (conscious or unconscious) is motivated in part by strategic considerations, and test this experimentally. We find compelling supporting evidence in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have scored on an IQ test. In two-player tournaments where the higher score wins, a player is very likely to choose to compete when he knows that his own stated confidence is higher than the other player’s, but rarely when the reverse is true. Consistent with this behavior, stated confidence is inflated by males when deterrence is strategically optimal and is instead deflated (by males and females) when luring (encouraging entry) is strategically optimal. This behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Overconfident statements are used in environments that seem familiar, and we present evidence that suggests that this can occur on an unconscious level.
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ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-017-9526-3