Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions

Monitoring by long-term investors should reduce agency conflicts in firms' labor investment choices. Consistent with this argument, we find that abnormal net hiring, measured as the absolute deviation from optimal net hiring predicted by economic fundamentals, decreases in the presence of insti...

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Vydáno v:	Journal of corporate finance (Amsterdam, Netherlands) Ročník 64; s. 101634
Hlavní autoři:	Ghaly, Mohamed, Dang, Viet Anh, Stathopoulos, Konstantinos
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	Elsevier B.V 01.10.2020
Témata:	Corporate governance Employment Institutional ownership Investment efficiency Investment horizon Monitoring Institutional ownership Corporate governance Employment Investment horizon Investment efficiency Monitoring
ISSN:	0929-1199, 1872-6313
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
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