Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions

Monitoring by long-term investors should reduce agency conflicts in firms' labor investment choices. Consistent with this argument, we find that abnormal net hiring, measured as the absolute deviation from optimal net hiring predicted by economic fundamentals, decreases in the presence of insti...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Journal of corporate finance (Amsterdam, Netherlands) Vol. 64; p. 101634
Main Authors:	Ghaly, Mohamed, Dang, Viet Anh, Stathopoulos, Konstantinos
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier B.V 01.10.2020
Subjects:	Corporate governance Employment Institutional ownership Investment efficiency Investment horizon Monitoring Institutional ownership Corporate governance Employment Investment horizon Investment efficiency Monitoring
ISSN:	0929-1199, 1872-6313
Online Access:	Get full text
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