A Cyber-Security Methodology for a Cyber-Physical Industrial Control System Testbed

Due to recent increase in deployment of Cyber-Physical Industrial Control Systems in different critical infrastructures, addressing cyber-security challenges of these systems is vital for assuring their reliability and secure operation in presence of malicious cyber attacks. Towards this end, develo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE access Vol. 9; pp. 16239 - 16253
Main Authors: Noorizadeh, Mohammad, Shakerpour, Mohammad, Meskin, Nader, Unal, Devrim, Khorasani, Khashayar
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Piscataway IEEE 2021
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
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ISSN:2169-3536, 2169-3536
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Due to recent increase in deployment of Cyber-Physical Industrial Control Systems in different critical infrastructures, addressing cyber-security challenges of these systems is vital for assuring their reliability and secure operation in presence of malicious cyber attacks. Towards this end, developing a testbed to generate real-time data-sets for critical infrastructure that would be utilized for validation of real-time attack detection algorithms are indeed highly needed. This paper investigates and proposes the design and implementation of a cyber-physical industrial control system testbed where the Tennessee Eastman process is simulated in real-time on a PC and the closed-loop controllers are implemented on the Siemens PLCs. False data injection cyber attacks are injected to the developed testbed through the man-in-the-middle structure where the malicious hackers can in real-time modify the sensor measurements that are sent to the PLCs. Furthermore, various cyber attack detection algorithms are developed and implemented in real-time on the testbed and their performance and capabilities are compared and evaluated.
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ISSN:2169-3536
2169-3536
DOI:10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3053135