Further improvements of the estimation of key enumeration with applications to solving LWE

In post-quantum cryptography, Learning With Errors (LWE) is one of the dominant underlying mathematical problems. The dual attack is one of the main strategies for solving the LWE problem, and it has recently gathered significant attention within the research community. The attack strategy consists...

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Vydáno v:	Cryptography and communications Ročník 16; číslo 5; s. 1163 - 1182
Hlavní autoři:	Budroni, Alessandro, Mårtensson, Erik
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	New York Springer US 01.09.2024 Springer Nature B.V
Témata:	Algorithms Annan elektroteknik och elektronik Binomial distribution Circuits Coding and Information Theory Communications Engineering Computer Science Data Structures and Information Theory Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering Elektroteknik och elektronik Engineering and Technology Enumeration Information and Communication Mathematics of Computing Networks Normal distribution Other Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering Probability Probability distribution Quantum cryptography Success Teknik 68P30 Learning with Errors Lattice-based cryptography Dual attacks 94A60 Cryptography
ISSN:	1936-2447, 1936-2455, 1936-2455
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
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Popis
Shrnutí:	In post-quantum cryptography, Learning With Errors (LWE) is one of the dominant underlying mathematical problems. The dual attack is one of the main strategies for solving the LWE problem, and it has recently gathered significant attention within the research community. The attack strategy consists of a lattice reduction part and a distinguishing part. The latter includes an enumeration subroutine over a certain number of positions of the secret key. Our contribution consists of giving a precise and efficient approach for calculating the expected complexity of such an enumeration procedure, which was missing in the literature. This allows us to decrease the estimated cost of the whole dual attack, both classically and quantumly, on well-known protocols such as Kyber, Saber, and TFHE. In addition, we explore different enumeration strategies to investigate some potential further improvements. As our method of calculating the expected cost of enumeration is pretty general, it might be of independent interest in other areas of cryptanalysis or even in different research areas.
Bibliografie:	ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14
ISSN:	1936-2447 1936-2455 1936-2455
DOI:	10.1007/s12095-024-00722-1