Active Defense Research against False Data Injection Attacks of Power CPS Based on Data-Driven Algorithms

The terminal equipment interconnection and the network communication environment are complex in power cyber–physical systems (CPS), and the frequent interaction between the information and energy flows aggravates the risk of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in the power grid. This paper proposes...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Energies (Basel) Vol. 15; no. 19; p. 7432
Main Authors: Bo, Xiaoyong, Qu, Zhaoyang, Wang, Lei, Dong, Yunchang, Zhang, Zhenming, Wang, Da
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Basel MDPI AG 01.10.2022
Subjects:
active defense
Algorithms
Analysis
Communication
Communications networks
Data processing
data-driven
Defense mechanisms
Electric power transmission
false data injection attacks
Linear programming
Methods
power cyber–physical systems
Power supply
Random variables
variational auto-encoder
ISSN:1996-1073, 1996-1073
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The terminal equipment interconnection and the network communication environment are complex in power cyber–physical systems (CPS), and the frequent interaction between the information and energy flows aggravates the risk of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in the power grid. This paper proposes an active defense framework against FDIAs of power CPS based on data-driven algorithms in order to ensure that FDIAs can be efficiently detected and processed in real-time during power grid operation. First, the data transmission scenario and false data injection forms of power CPS were analyzed, and the FDIA mathematical model was expounded. Then, from a data-driven perspective, the algorithm improvement and process design were carried out for the three key links of data enhancement, attack detection, and data reconstruction. Finally, an active defense framework against FDIAs was proposed. The example analysis verified that the method proposed in this paper could effectively detect FDIAs and perform data reconstruction, providing a new idea for the active defense against FDIAs of power CPS.
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ISSN:1996-1073
1996-1073
DOI:10.3390/en15197432