Solving multi-leader-common-follower games

Multi-leader-common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to another group of competitive firms, the followers, that react to the decisions made by the leaders. These problems lead in a natural way to equilibrium problems...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Optimization methods & software Jg. 25; H. 4; S. 601 - 623
Hauptverfasser:	Leyffer, Sven, Munson, Todd
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Abingdon Taylor & Francis 01.08.2010 Taylor & Francis Ltd
Schlagworte:	equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints Leadership Mathematical programming mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints Nash games nonlinear complementarity problems Nonlinear programming Stackelberg games
ISSN:	1055-6788, 1029-4937
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!