Solving multi-leader-common-follower games

Multi-leader-common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to another group of competitive firms, the followers, that react to the decisions made by the leaders. These problems lead in a natural way to equilibrium problems...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:

Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:	Optimization methods & software Ročník 25; číslo 4; s. 601 - 623
Hlavní autoři:	Leyffer, Sven, Munson, Todd
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	Abingdon Taylor & Francis 01.08.2010 Taylor & Francis Ltd
Témata:	equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints Leadership Mathematical programming mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints Nash games nonlinear complementarity problems Nonlinear programming Stackelberg games
ISSN:	1055-6788, 1029-4937
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
Tagy:	Přidat tag Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!

Popis
Shrnutí:	Multi-leader-common-follower games arise when modelling two or more competitive firms, the leaders, that commit to their decisions prior to another group of competitive firms, the followers, that react to the decisions made by the leaders. These problems lead in a natural way to equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We develop a characterization of the solution sets for these problems and examine a variety of nonlinear optimization and nonlinear complementarity formulations of EPECs. We distinguish two broad cases: problems where the leaders can cost-differentiate and problems with price-consistent followers. We demonstrate the practical viability of our approach by solving a range of medium-sized test problems.
Bibliografie:	SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14
ISSN:	1055-6788 1029-4937
DOI:	10.1080/10556780903448052