Interpersonal harm aversion as a necessary foundation for morality: A developmental neuroscience perspective

Growing evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience emphasizes the importance of third-party harm aversion for constructing morality. A sensitivity to interpersonal harm emerges very early in ontogeny, as reflected in both the capacity for implicit social evaluation and an aversio...

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Vydáno v:	Development and psychopathology Ročník 30; číslo 1; s. 153 - 164
Hlavní autoři:	Decety, Jean, Cowell, Jason M.
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	United States Cambridge University Press 01.02.2018
Témata:	Altruism Animal cognition Approach-Avoidance Attention Aversion Avoidance behavior Behavior Brain research Cognition Cognitive ability Cognitive-behavioral factors Cooperation Cultural factors Decision Making Developmental psychology Humans Morality Morals Motivation Nervous system Neurosciences Ontogeny Pain Physiology Psychology Psychopathology Social Behavior Social cognition Social environment Social interactions Social Perception Social psychology Socialization Valuation
ISSN:	0954-5794, 1469-2198, 1469-2198
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
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Shrnutí:	Growing evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience emphasizes the importance of third-party harm aversion for constructing morality. A sensitivity to interpersonal harm emerges very early in ontogeny, as reflected in both the capacity for implicit social evaluation and an aversion for antisocial agents. Yet it does not necessarily entail avoidance toward inflicting pain to others. Later, an understanding that harmful actions cause suffering emerges, followed by an integration of rules that can depend on social contexts and cultures. These developmental findings build on a burgeoning literature, which suggests that the fundamental nature of moral and social cognition, including their motivational and hedonic value, lies in general computational processes such as attention, approach–avoidance, social valuation, and decision making rather than in fully distinct, dedicated neural regions for morality. Bridging the gap between cognition and behaviors and the requisite affective, motivational, and cognitive mechanisms, a developmental neuroscience approach enriches our understanding of the emergence of morality.
Bibliografie:	ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 ObjectType-Review-3 content type line 23
ISSN:	0954-5794 1469-2198 1469-2198
DOI:	10.1017/S0954579417000530