Interpersonal harm aversion as a necessary foundation for morality: A developmental neuroscience perspective

Growing evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience emphasizes the importance of third-party harm aversion for constructing morality. A sensitivity to interpersonal harm emerges very early in ontogeny, as reflected in both the capacity for implicit social evaluation and an aversio...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Development and psychopathology Vol. 30; no. 1; pp. 153 - 164
Main Authors: Decety, Jean, Cowell, Jason M.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: United States Cambridge University Press 01.02.2018
Subjects:
Altruism
Animal cognition
Approach-Avoidance
Attention
Aversion
Avoidance behavior
Behavior
Brain research
Cognition
Cognitive ability
Cognitive-behavioral factors
Cooperation
Cultural factors
Decision Making
Developmental psychology
Humans
Morality
Morals
Motivation
Nervous system
Neurosciences
Ontogeny
Pain
Physiology
Psychology
Psychopathology
Social Behavior
Social cognition
Social environment
Social interactions
Social Perception
Social psychology
Socialization
Valuation
ISSN:0954-5794, 1469-2198, 1469-2198
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Growing evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience emphasizes the importance of third-party harm aversion for constructing morality. A sensitivity to interpersonal harm emerges very early in ontogeny, as reflected in both the capacity for implicit social evaluation and an aversion for antisocial agents. Yet it does not necessarily entail avoidance toward inflicting pain to others. Later, an understanding that harmful actions cause suffering emerges, followed by an integration of rules that can depend on social contexts and cultures. These developmental findings build on a burgeoning literature, which suggests that the fundamental nature of moral and social cognition, including their motivational and hedonic value, lies in general computational processes such as attention, approach–avoidance, social valuation, and decision making rather than in fully distinct, dedicated neural regions for morality. Bridging the gap between cognition and behaviors and the requisite affective, motivational, and cognitive mechanisms, a developmental neuroscience approach enriches our understanding of the emergence of morality.
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ISSN:0954-5794
1469-2198
1469-2198
DOI:10.1017/S0954579417000530