Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preferenc...

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Vydáno v:Psychological inquiry Ročník 21; číslo 4; s. 279 - 294
Hlavní autoři: Betsch, Tilmann, Glöckner, Andreas
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Taylor & Francis Group 30.11.2010
Témata:
Bounded rationality
Cognitive models
Decision making
Experimental psychology
Heuristics
Intuition
Irony
Judgment
Memory
Social psychology
ISSN:1047-840X, 1532-7965
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Popis
Shrnutí:We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.
ISSN:1047-840X
1532-7965
DOI:10.1080/1047840X.2010.517737